Prediksi Soal TWK TIU TKP Persiapan Seleksi CPNS PPPK 2023/2024

Prediksi Soal TWK TIU TKP Persiapan Seleksi CPNS PPPK 2023/2024

Kabar gembira bagi masyarakat yang menunggu kabar pembukaan CPNS 2023. Pasalnya, seleksi CPNS 2023 akan segera dibuka dalam waktu dekat ini.


Berdasarkan pernyataan resmi dari Menteri Pendayagunaan Aparatur Negara dan Reformasi Birokrasi (Menpan RB) Abdullah Azwar Anas, CPNS 2023 akan dibuka pada September mendatang.  


Info terbarunya, Pemerintah telah menetapkan sebanyak 572.474 formasi untuk PPPK dan CPNS 2023.


Padahal total kebutuhan ASN nasional 2023 yang dibeberkan sebelumnya adalah sebanyak 1.030.751 untuk PPPK dan CPNS 2023 baik di pemerintah pusat maupun pemerintah daerah. 


Berikut rincian formasi terbaru PPPK dan CPNS 2023


1. Pemerintah Pusat: 78.861

  • CPNS: 28.903
  • PPPK: 49.968

2. Pemerintah Daerah: 493.613

  • PPPK Guru: 296.084
  • PPPK Tenaga Kesehatan: 154.672
  • PPPK Tenaga Teknis: 42.857

Oleh sebab itu perlu ada nya persiapan untuk menghadapi seleksi SKD maupun SKB dalam mengikuti CPNS dan PPPK 2023 nanti, berikut ini adalah kumpulan soal SKD dan SKB seleksi CPNS 2023.


Prediksi Soal TWK TIU TKP Persiapan Seleksi CPNS PPPK 2023/2024


TWK (tes wawasan kebangsaan), TIU (tes intelegensi umum), dan TKP (tes karakteristik pribadi)

  • Rangkuman TWK (tes wawasan kebangsaan) 2023
  • Rangkuman TIU (tes intelegensi umum) 2023
  • Rangkuman TKP (tes karakteristik pribadi) 2023


Rangkuman Mater dan Soal Dapat Mengunjungi Edukasi Campus

Fiscal-monetary interaction

Fiscal-monetary interaction


An email correspondent sent the above graph. The title is [Federal Reserve] Liabilities and Capital: Liabilities: Earnings Remittances Due to the U.S. Treasury.

The Treasury pays the Fed interest on the Fed's asset holdings. The Fed pays interest on reserves to banks and to other financial institutions that have, effectively, deposits at the Fed. As long as Treasury interest is greater than interest the Fed pays, the Fed makes money. It spends some, and returns the interest to the Treasury. The Fed also issues cash, which pays no interest, so the Fed makes steady money on the difference between interest bearing assets and the zero return of cash. 

But when short-term rates the Fed pays rise sufficiently above the Fed's interest earnings, the Fed loses money. It stops sending interest earnings to the Treasury. The graph is in essence the amount the Fed owes the Treasury in this scheme. Usually the Fed makes some money -- the graph goes up -- then the Fed pays out to the Treasury and the graph goes back to near zero. When the Fed loses money, the Treasury doesn't send a check. Instead, the Fed accumulates its losses, $16 billion so far. The Fed then will wait to make this amount back again before it starts sending money back to the Treasury. 

For broad brush macroeconomics, the Fed and Treasury are left and right pockets of the federal government. As interest rates rise, the government is going to pay more interest on its debt. 

The Fed's massive QE operation has undone a lot of the Treasury's long-term debt, which would have kept interest costs from rising so fast. So, really, this is just a measure of the extra interest on the debt that QE has caused.  The Fed and Treasury like to think of themselves as more separate, so there are political and institutional implications.  

$16 billion isn't a huge amount in today's Washington, but the graph is interesting on a process starting to get under way.  

No, the Fed is not about to go bankrupt. The Fed can print money, so conventional bankruptcy that happens when you can't pay bills simply cannot happen. If the Fed had no assets at all, it could simply print money -- create new reserves -- to pay the interest on outstanding reserves. That would only come to an end if the Fed had to soak up reserves or cash by selling assets to avoid inflation.

The accounting is a little weird. The Fed only counts interest income, and ignores mark to market values. So this is the accumulated amount of interest received on the Fed's assets minus interest paid on reserves. The Fed has, of course, taken a bath in mark to market values as interest rates rise. The Fed doesn't worry about it, because it can hold the securities to maturity. However, this means the Fed will likely have to hold them to maturity. The Fed now has $8.5 trillion of assets. A speedy "quantitative tightening," selling those assets, would force it to recognize mark to market losses. So don't count on that event. Fortunately, in my view of the world, QE didn't do much but shorten the maturity structure of outstanding debt, so the lack of QT won't be missed. Others disagree. 

Alyssa Anderson, Philippa Marks, Dave Na, Bernd Schlusche, and Zeynep Senyuz at the Fed have a very nice analysis of this situation, along with explanations of how it all works. They use the following projections of interest rates


With those projections, here's what happens to the Fed's interest income and expense: 

Notice how interest income dips 2022-2025 even though interest rates are rising. The Fed is still sitting on old bonds with very low interest rates. Interest income starts rising when these mature, and the Fed reinvests in new bonds with higher interest rates. Interest expense largely follows the reasonably rosy scenario that the funds rate eases as inflation goes away. (Top left graph looks like botton right graph.) 

Their bottom line 

Remittance to the treasury stop for a few years, while interest expense is greater than earnings. But then pick up again once the Fed can roll over its asset portfolio. The "deferred asset," which is the inverse of my top graph rises, rises considerably above today's $16 billion, but then goes away once the Fed rolls over its assets and interest earnings recover. 

All well and good, but the grumpy economist can think of plenty of ways this can go wrong! Suppose inflation does not fade away and substantial interest rate hikes are needed. Suppose, for example, we replay 1980, when short-term interest rates shot up to nearly 20%. Except this time with a huge balance sheet, and paying interest on reserves? 


The Fed's $8.5 trillion assets correspond to about $6.2 trillion of interest-paying liabilities, including $4 trillion reserves, plus $2.3 trillion currency. Even assuming people still will hold that much currency as interest rates spike (they won't, and didn't in 1980), $6.2 trillion times 15% equals nearly $1 trillion of interest expense. Now we are starting to talk some real money. And the Fed's maturity shortening exercise will start to bite the Treasury as well. 

We now have also seen that negative long-term bond rates are possible. A perpetually negatively sloped yield curve is also possible. If we go back to that, central banks holding long bonds and issuing cash will have to rethink their model.

The real fiscal issue will be how higher interest rates lead to higher interest costs on the federal debt. The Fed here shortened the debt, making that issue bite a little sooner than it otherwise would have. But the main problem is the overall amount of debt and how short term that is already. 

HT thanks to some anonymous correspondents who helped me puzzle out how this works (I hope I got it right) and pointed me to the Fed study. 



Calomiris on Gramm Ekelund and Early on Income Distribution.

Calomiris on Gramm Ekelund and Early on Income Distribution.

Charles Calomiris has a splendid WSJ review of a great book, "The Myth of American Inequality" by by Phil Gramm, Robert Ekelund and John Early.

It is a "'a truth universally acknowledged,' according to the Economist magazine in 2020" that 

little progress has been made in raising average American living standards since the 1960s; that poverty has not been substantially reduced over the period; that the median household’s standard of living has not increased in recent years and inequality is currently high and rising 

Most of all the last one. 

All of this is false. Most of all the last one. 

1) Income. The central jaw-dropping, astonishing fact: The statistics you read about income and income inequality ignore taxes and transfers. By doing so, of course, they create a problem that is immune to its purported solution! 

Especially on the low end, transfers including in-kind transfers (housing, medical payments, etc.) are a huge part of consumption and properly measured income. 

Pay especially attention on the left hand side of the graph. Actual income is essentially flat in the first three quintiles of earned income. 


Gramm Ekelund and Early are fond of quintile bar graphs, like this one. The bars are pretty flat from the lowest to third decile, and transfer income is a big part of the story. 

More, do just a little bit of adjustment for household size. Single person households are obviously going to have less income than two-earner households. Households with children have less per capita income, but people with kids may be more likely to work. How does it work out? In per capita terms (middle) actual income, including taxes and transfers is almost completely flat in the first four deciles. 

2) Work. Well, a good anti-capitalist might say, this just proves the point. Look how dreadful the distribution of income before taxes and transfers is, and admittedly getting wider. Raw capitalism is destroying the poor, and only the maginficence of the welfare state is keeping them going. One answer might be, ok, but let's at least measure how we're doing rather than just keep publishing the false statistic as if we're doing nothing. 

But there is a better answer. Why is it that the pre-transfer earnings of the lower quintile are so low, and pre-transfer inequality getting larger? Because they aren't working. 

Average hours per week 17.3 vs. 38.6; workers per household from 0.2 to 2.0. Sort of mechanically, if you don't work you don't have earned income.

Why has work collapsed in the bottom decile? Here we might have a big debate. $11.76 per hour (2017) isn't a lot. But the previous graphs certainly contain a suggestion worth pursuing: The effective marginal tax rate in the lowest three quintiles is effectively 100%. Earn a dollar, and lose a dollar of benefits. Why work?  

Gramm Ekelund and Early are careful, and don't make any causal assertions here. They don't really even stress the fact popping from the table as much as I have. But the fact is a fact, a nearly 100% tax rate + an income effect isn't a positive for labor supply, and the amount of work in lower quintiles has plummeted.  This is a book about facing facts and this one is undeniable. 

One might also complain that people don't value in-kind transfers. Medicaid is expensive to the government and awful. Government provided housing isn't great and it isn't where you might want to live. Gramm Ekelund and Early value transfers at cost. If $20,000 worth of Medicaid is only worth $5,000 to the recipient, there is a problem with Medicaid! 

3) Time.  The Standard Narrative says that things are getting worse over time, and people are stuck in their income bins. Neither is true. Actual income, after transfers, and properly accounting for inflation -- has not been stagnating or declining over time. One reason is, again, the simple failure to account for the enormous increase in transfers. 




Again, the first three deciles are dramatic. The decline in earned income in the top is indeed worrisome but it comes as above from a decline in work. Discuss among yourselves where that comes from. 

A second feature is that the CPI does a poor job of measuring living standards across long periods of time, because it doesn't account well for quality improvement and the fact that people shift consumption to cheaper items. Do you really want a small 1970s house, a Ford Pinto, and medical care that can't cure most cancers? 


Bottom line, here is the fact: 



Oh, and being stuck is also not true. There is a lot of turnover of quintiles, and overall growth does help even those who stay in the same quintile. And, as you might guess, the most likely to underperform their parents are the kids of the super-rich. Elon Musk's kids are very unlikely to do as well as he did, and there is a lot of luck in being super rich. 


There is lots, lots more in the book, including the fortunes of the super-wealthy. There is also a lot on "poverty." As you can guess official definitions of poverty leave out many transfers. 

As Calomiris sums up, 
This book is written in straightforward American English, not in economic think-tank jargon. It shows clearly how each element of the analysis (taxation, transfers, inflation adjustment) contributes to its conclusions. Graphs and tables are comprehensive and comprehensible. The style is lively and lucid...
The analysis probes deeply to demonstrate the robustness of its conclusions..
Most important, the authors don’t clutter their analysis with contentious approaches to measurement, and they limit their policy recommendations to those that flow self-evidently from the facts they document. It is encouraging that three disparate economists can together write an objective book about the measurement of living standards, poverty and inequality without engaging in partisan advocacy that undermines their findings. (“While we each have our opinions and political views,” writes Mr. Gramm in a preface, “we share a desire to get the facts straight.”)

My sense is that the book is not having the impact it should. Economists love complex empirical work, and the mainstream media does not, ahem, appreciate a book that so transparently demolishes the Standard Narrative. 

It's a great read. 

*****

Update: Much subsequent discussion here and on twitter revolves around just what's included and omitted in "income" by various authors. An email correspondent, frustrated with Blogger's comment feature (me too) sends the following response to Joe Smith, below: 

A place to start is a 2018 Cato paper by John Early "Reassessing the Facts about Inequality, Poverty, and Redistribution". It includes a version of Figure 2.1 above, explanations of major categories, and lists sources. 

I went to Early's very nice paper, and here are some excerpts: 

  • Census money income estimates explicitly exclude the following:4
  • The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC)
  • The monetary value of benefits from the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), more commonly known as food stamps
  • Free or subsidized medical care such as Medicaid and the Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP)
  • Free, subsidized, or controlled rent or other “affordable housing” schemes
  • Heating subsidies
  • Free or reduced-fee social services such as daycare, tax preparation, or meal services

The EITC is given to low-income families with at least one employed person. In 2015, the annual credit was as much as $6,242 per household and was given to households with incomes as high as $53,267. The EITC is a “refundable” tax credit, meaning that if an individual owes no income taxes, money equal to the entire credit is sent to the filer. The EITC has all the characteristics of money income, but it is not counted as such by the Census Bureau.

The government has defined the EITC and other refundable credits as “negative taxes.” Government reports of expenditures are understated because the money paid for the EITC payments is not included. Taxes are also understated by the amount of the EITC because it is subtracted from the reported tax collections.

SNAP funds are paid as money on a debit card, but they are defined as in-kind income and not counted because they can nominally be spent only on food. Rent subsidies, free medical care through Medicaid, and any free social services are also deemed as in-kind income and are excluded from the calculations.

I found the last sentence revealing. Philosophically, the census wants to leave out "in-kind income." But of course for evaluating people's standard of living that matters a lot. It's not wrong, it's just a definition, useful for some things but not for others. Like, evaluating people's standard of living. 

Interesting as well, 

Compared with amounts reported to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), the CPS underestimates retirement income by at least 60 percent in each income quintile. IRS data show 50 percent more households with private pension income, and for those households reporting pension income the IRS shows 50 percent more income than the CPS does.6 No one would report too much income to the IRS, so the higher IRS comparisons are reliably the minimum limit of underreporting.

There is a lot more in the paper, and I'm perhaps doing the book a disservice, as I recall from reading it last summer that it is very clear and transparent about what the definitions of "income" are and just why they come to such different conclusions from others. But I add this to give a flavor of the issues. 


FTPL revised Ch. 5 draft

FTPL revised Ch. 5 draft

The book isn't out yet, but I can't help myself... A revised draft of Chapter 5, fiscal theory in sticky price models is up on my website here. Giving talks over the last year and writing some subsequent essays, I see clearer ways to present the sticky price models.  Bottom line, these three graphs provide a nice capsule summary of what fiscal theory is all about: 


Response of inflation, output and price level to a 1% deficit shock, with no change in interest rates. Bondholders lose from a long period of inflation above the nominal interest rate. Inflation goes away eventually on its own. 

Response of inflation, output and price level to a permanent interest rate rise, with no change in fiscal policy, and sticky prices. The main line uses long-term debt. The omega=1 line uses roughly one year debt. The omega = infinity line uses instantaneous debt. Higher interest rates can temporarily lower inflation with long term debt. With short-term debt, despite sticky prices, inflation follows the interest rate exactly. Sticky prices do not imply sticky inflation. 


Responser to a 1% fiscal shock, with a monetary policy response with Taylor coefficient one, and long term debt. By shifting inflation forward, the central bank eliminates almost all output volatility. The fiscal shock falls on long-term bondholders, who suffer a price drop at time 0. 

Details and interpretation in the new draft. 

I'll keep updating as we go along. Comments and typos welcome. 

And... there are still 4 days to go of the 30% discount at Princeton University Press. Use code P321. 

Happy new year to all.  

Stanford hates fun

Source: Stanford Daily

Stanford hates fun is the title of the second Stanford article in the Wall Street Journal this week. (On the first, Stanford's guide to acceptable words, enough said already.) 

This has been bubbling up for a while. Last June, Ginevra Davis wrote a powerful article in Palladium, "Stanford's war on social life." She recounted how the slightly transgressive Stanford atmosphere in the 90s, which seeded the slightly transgressive get it done attitude of tech in the early 2000s, is being smothered by the Administration. For example, back in the early 90s, 

...The brothers were winding down from Kappa Alpha’s annual Cabo-themed party on the house lawn.... a day-to-night extravaganza that would start sometime in the morning and continue long after midnight. The girls wore bikini tops and plastic flower leis, and the boys wore their best Hawaiian shirts.

Uh-oh, I can already smell trouble if you tried that today. But the point,  

That year, the brothers had filled the entire main level of Kappa Alpha’s house with a layer of sand six inches deep. The night was almost over; the guests were leaving and the local surf rock band had been paid their customary hundred dollars in beer. The only question was what to do with all the sand.

No one remembers who had the idea to build the island. A group of five or six brothers managed the project. One rented a bulldozer...

Later that year, the brothers installed a zipline from the roof of their house to the center of the island. They also built a barge, which they would paddle around the lake on weekends and between classes.

More generally 

Through the late 1990s, Stanford ... featured a wacky campus culture that combined collegiate prep with West Coast laissez-faire. Stanford was home to a rich patchwork of wild and experimental campus life. Communal living houses (“co-ops”) encouraged casual nudity, while fraternities threw a raucous annual “Greek Week” and lit their houses on fire. Until 2013, Stanford hosted a fully student-run anarchist house, where residents covered the walls with eccentric murals. 

Today, 

The Kappa Alpha boys have been kicked out of their old house. Lake Lagunita was closed to student activities in 2001,...

...In less than a decade, Stanford’s administration eviscerated a hundred years of undergraduate culture and social groups. They ended decades-old traditions. They drove student groups out of their houses. They scraped names off buildings. They went after long-established hubs of student life, like fraternities and cultural theme houses...

A powerful observation: This spirit of self-organization, slightly transgressive but organized fun taught students how to organize things like the 2000s tech revolution.  

Stanford’s support for the unconventional pioneered a new breed of elite student: the charismatic builder who excelled at “breaking things” in nearby Silicon Valley.

... unlike most elite schools, ...Stanford ... was also fun. Stanford had created a global talent hub combined with explicit permission for rule-breaking. As a result, students learned a valuable lesson: they had agency; they could create their own norms and culture instead of relying on higher authorities.

Young kids need to be out in the playground negotiating the rules themselves, without lots of parents and coaches around. College students need self-organized parties and pranks to learn to be tech entrepreneurs. I had always disparaged "party schools" as places with too much drinking and not enough studying, and most parties seem to me like a pointless drunken bacchanalia. But the importance of self-organized activity is something I had missed. 

The article explains nicely the advantages of fraternities and sororities to young people.

In the middle of my freshman year, I started noticing that students, particularly older ones not in a housed Greek organization, seemed quite aimless and very lonely.... 

When students live together, united by a shared identity, they tend to look after each other. The boys in one fraternity sleep together in a pile on the floor. Girls in housed sororities leave their doors open and treat their clothes like a communal wardrobe.

The process

In 2013, the administration took over the student-run anarchist house and painted over the old murals. The next year, Stanford drained the remnants of Lake Lagunita, where students used to gather to host bonfires, and ended the annual anything-but-clothes party known as Exotic Erotic. And the year after that, in 2015, the administration put the notoriously anti-establishment Leland Stanford Junior University Marching Band on “super-probation,” the culmination of years of increasing restrictions on their antics.

over the ensuing years, the Band mostly lost its raucous, fraternity-esque culture, and stopped doing anything particularly controversial. Once, the Band mocked Stanford’s rivals with crass marching formations; today, the Band designs all their pranks based on pre-approved themes from the university and clears the final plans with a panel of administrators.

Then they came for the fraternities

One night, I was biking home late from the Caltrain. I made it halfway back to my dorm before I realized that something was missing. Music. It was a Friday night, but the campus was completely silent.

Unlike Harvard, which abruptly tried to ban “single-gender social organizations” and was immediately sued by alumni, Stanford picked off the Greek life organizations one by one to avoid student or alumni pushback. The playbook was always the same. Some incident would spark an investigation, and the administration would insist that the offending organization had lost its right to remain on campus. The group would be promptly removed.

...When Stanford could not remove a student organization for bad behavior, they found other justifications. One such case was the end of Outdoor House, an innocuous haven on the far side of campus for students who liked hiking. The official explanation from Stanford for eliminating the house was that the Outdoor theme “fell short of diversity, equity and inclusion expectations.” ...

Next year, Outdoor House will be reinstated, but only because house members promised to refocus their theme on “racial and environmental justice in the outdoors.” Upholding diversity, equity, and inclusion is the first of four “ResX principles” that now govern undergraduate housing. Stanford reserves the right to unhouse any organization that does not, in their opinion, uphold these principles. 

Covid provided the excuse to really clamp down. The new system sounds awfully bleak.  

The first thing Stanford announced was the introduction of a new housing system, designed to promote “fairness” and “community” on campus. Under the system, new freshmen would be assigned to one of eight artificially-created housing groups called “neighborhoods,” each containing a representative sample of campus housing. 

The reality of the neighborhood system is that it strips students of their ability to form distinct personalities or formal friend groups. I am in Neighborhood S. Some of my friends are in Neighborhood N. It doesn’t actually matter. The neighborhoods are not based on geography—many houses in the same “neighborhood” are on opposite sides of campus—and have no personalities outside of their letter name. They are distinctions without meaning. 

... students in “bad housing”—the labyrinth of themeless, meaningless dorms awaiting most Stanford students—rarely bother to learn their neighbor’s names. Hallways are quiet and doors are locked. Without a strong existing support network, these students can easily bounce from anonymous dorms, to lecture halls, to cavernous dining halls without anyone acknowledging their presence for days.

..Stanford students live in brand new buildings with white walls. We have a $20 million dollar meditation center that nobody uses. But students didn’t ask for any of that. We just wanted a dirty house with friends.

When I tell current Stanford students the story about JP and his island, I swear their eyes pop out of their heads. Everything was so different then. It sounds like a story from another school—the house, the lake, and the groundskeeper who let the boys pass. But mostly, what feels foreign is the spirit expressed by the six brothers, the wild unfettered joy. 

A bottom line 

Stanford’s new social order offers a peek into the bureaucrat’s vision for America. It is a world without risk, genuine difference, or the kind of group connection that makes teenage boys want to rent bulldozers and build islands.. 

*** 

Izzy Meyerson followed up in the Stanford Daily. Izzy transferred from the University of Chicago,  

...the place where “fun goes to die.” Yet, in my first quarter at Stanford, I found myself missing the unique community hubs that so easily brought people together at the University of Chicago: the student run coffee shops, each with its own personality (the one for indie kids, the one for econ bros and their adjacents, the one for more edgy, subversive “alt” students, etc…), the student center, even the silent Harper Library, which was a place for me to hang with friends and meet new people...

When I was at UChicago, there was an active effort underway to make the school more appealing to the general high achieving high school student... This involved embracing looser restrictions ... and a new community-driven student life strategy. It seems to me that Stanford is heading in the opposite direction, embracing the “where fun goes to die” mantra that UChicago is trying so hard to shed.

...when I arrived at Stanford in the fall of 2021, I saw a dull and tired campus, one that had forgotten it was supposed to be the fun California school... I spent much of my time working in my room, and I am someone that hates working in my room. But there were few social places to work on campus where you could meet new people. I felt awkward and unwelcome when I walked into the first floor of Green to absolute silence and stares from people as the squeak of my shoes seemed to fill the emptiness of the space.

Izzy has a deep point. The lack of campus social life is about a lot more than big alcohol-fueled parties.  

...Stanford has been eroding away traditions (such as Full Moon on the Quad) and historical community hubs through the Neighborhood System. This was easy for them to do — there was an entire year of remote schooling in which traditions were not passed down to the incoming class, and so their demise was imminent. Though such traditions may seem frivolous, it is exactly these small, uniquely Stanford events that bring people together...

..what makes college so valuable is the relationships you make with others across wide and varying backgrounds.... But we must have access to abundant social interactions and involvements for such meaningful growth to take place. So, I implore you, Stanford, to embrace “fun” again, revitalize our unique campus culture, not simply for the enjoyment of the student body but to allow your students to build themselves into complex and diverse beings. 

The WSJ notes  

Stanford began mandating students file an application two weeks ahead of a party including a list of attendees, along with sober monitors, students said.

The number of registered parties dwindled to 45 during the first four weeks of school this fall, down from 158 over the same period in 2019, according to the Stanford Daily.

My jaw dropped.  Filing an application for a party two weeks ahead of time? Deciding what party you're going to go to two weeks ahead of time? You must be kidding. I went to MIT, lived in a dorm, and even there parties were organized about 5 minutes ahead of time! "List of attendees?" Is this China? The university keeps track of who is invited to what party? 

What's going on? It's right there -- "Upholding diversity, equity, and inclusion is the first of four “ResX principles” that now govern undergraduate housing.." " Stanford announced was the introduction of a new housing system, designed to promote “fairness”.."  The bureaucrat's vision of "Diversity, Equity and Inclusion" cannot stand any self-organization by students. Voluntary association might not be sufficiently "diverse" and "inclusive" (except, of course, the "affinity" groups which are deliberately not diverse and inclusive.) The only way to be "equitably" "included," apparently, is to be equally, intensely, lonely and miserable. So even the most minor social organization, like having a party, must be policed by bureaucrats. And smothered in the process. 

No wonder there is a mental health crisis! Living all alone in a faceless dorm with closed doors would drive any 18 year old nuts. I found my first years in a college dorm intensely difficult, and only the fellowship of the irreverent Burton Third Bombers got me through. (Thank you all!) I can't imagine living all alone in a motel-like silent dorm a thousand miles from home. I would have cracked too. 

***

Stanford's response, per WSJ, could be written by The Onion, 

Samuel Santos Jr., associate vice provost of inclusion, community and integrative learning within the Division of Student Affairs, says the school is working to address students’ concerns about Stanford’s social atmosphere.

The party-planning process will be streamlined and more administrators will be hired to help facilitate student social life.

“We want events to be fun, inclusive and safe and those things can happen,” Mr. Santos says. “They just require collaboration and honesty.”

Maybe the problem is reflected in the fact that Stanford has an "associate vice provost of inclusion, community and integrative learning" in the first place! Streamlining the paperwork to ask mommy for permission to have a party is not the answer. And  "more administrators will be hired !" Jaw drops again. Isn't it breathtakingly obvious that the problem is too many administrators in the first place? 

***

This may seem minor. Who cares if undergraduates have fun? Well, maybe some people care if undergraduates mature into confident people, capable of organizing a party without guidance and permission from the Ministry of Parties, before they head out into the world to start the next generation of tech companies. Or, more likely take jobs as deputy directors of "inclusion, community and integrative learning" at the newly sclerotic old tech companies. 

I hope, however, that Stanford's alumni will wake up and take notice. They are a key constituency for an institution that lives off their generous donations. The loss of academic freedom and free speech doesn't seem to bother them much, even when taken to the ridiculous such as the guide to acceptable words. The imposition of far-left politics under the "IDEAL" banner hasn't woken them up. 

But they give money in memory of the great time they had as undergraduates -- and the experiences that made their lifelong friends, molded their personalities, and were core foundations of their current success and personal happiness. Perhaps news that these core fond memories have gone up in smoke will catalyze them. 

Or, perhaps, universities are now more searching for a few billion dollar donors rather than regular checks from loyal alumni. $1.6 billion = 16,000,000 $100 checks. Inescapable math. But such donors want more public and political causes. 

***

Update:

Thanks for many comments and emails. 

I feel for the administrators, really. What do you do if you are provost and a big frat party has gotten out of hand? Well, the big university disciplinary machinery steps in and  write rules of engagement for the drunken bacchanalia. In the face of the title 9 and DEI bureaucrats, and their kangaroo-court procedures, this ends inevitably exactly where we are. 

I think the answer lies crucially here: Nothing. The price of self-organization is responsibility. Call the cops. If the frat gets sued, the frat gets sued. Rewrite the ground lease so that the frat is an independent organization. By having rules and disciplinary procedures, the university also protects the frat from its full responsibility. Maybe not, but somehow, the university has to separate itself from detailed frat management.  


 

Expectations and the neutrality of interest rates video

Expectations and the neutrality of interest rates video

I revised "Expectations and the neutrality of interest rates" and presented at the Hoover Economic Policy workshop. Thanks to the great Hoover team, here it is by video. If the embed doesn't work, here's the Hoover webpage with the video. The updated paper and slides are here


CDC, more on politicized agencies

Continuing a series on rot and politicization in administrative agencies... "Sure" comments on Marginal Revolution are fascinating. My excerpts:

The reasons you cannot change the CDC have little to do with remote work.  The major issues are:

2. It is overrun with academics....Many look at the CDC as complementary to an academic career and even the lifers have CVs at least compatible with going academic. This means a lot of the work product and setup is geared more toward publication, conference presentation, and deliberative work rather than rapid response.

A similar culture pervades the Fed. Fed researchers primarily regard the Fed as a home to write publications that will advance an academic career, with "policy work" culturally degraded. Both Board and regional Feds have developed into quite good centers for academic economic research, which seems overall a good thing, but one wonders just why the central bank should funnel what is in the end taxpayer money to this endeavor. However it also means that when inflation surges to 8%, nobody saw it coming, and we wonder why.  

3. The place has gone monocultural. ...Since 2015, their political donations have been 99.94% to Democrats. This means that they get bogged down in the latest vanguard concerns of the Democratic base and that they are increasingly ignorant about and isolated from the bulk of the populace. Things that make some sense in dense urban corridors where few people get dirty at work make little sense in sparsely populated areas with significant morbidity burdens from work.

As a monetary economist, I'm fixated on the Fed. According to the Independent Institute,  

...the ratio of Democrats to Republicans among Fed economists is 10.4 to 1. ... at the Board of Governors...48.5:1...in leadership positions 22.25:1.

Of course these ratios are not that different from economists overall, as evidenced by studies of AEA members and leadership. Still, academia is different from an agency that does, like it or not, operate in a political world. Back to the CDC 

4. The hiring is completely incestuous. A huge number of low-level folks have parents who worked there or at related institutions (e.g. NIH) and even larger proportions involve folks who share educational pedigrees (universities, med schools, advisers). And even if a president wants to change this, there are civil service protections,...and attribution of any cataclysm to this sort of personnel purge regardless of the real merits.

5. The activists are running rampant. Culturally competent pandemic management, as taught by the CDC, suggests that in a pandemic public health officials should not criticize cultural or ethnic leaders unnecessarily. They also suggest that you cannot shame or browbeat people into compliance with public health efforts, and that attempts to do so often backfire by having identity groups (religious, ethnic, national, etc.) respond to your nociceptive [relating to the perception or sensation of pain. I had to look it up] stimuli by rejecting previously accepted public health interventions. The worst messaging coming out of the CDC, particularly anonymously, violates all the guidelines I have seen the CDC issue when working overseas with MSF.

The deplorables don't like being treated like deplorables, and distrust your masks and vaccines when you do.   I couldn't quite figure out whether "Sure" means "cultural or ethnic leaders" on the left or right, but perhaps it is both, 

6. Doing your job well is boring. Most of the time you should be just making certain that resources (e.g. antibiotic stockpiles) are in place and that the same things that worked last time are ready to be implemented again (e.g. surge vaccination). And your ability to innovate and come up with something useful is pretty unlikely as there have been 50,000 people before you who give it their best stab. This leads to people "innovating" for the sake of "innovating". This leads to people amplifying secondary concerns like "representation", "equity", "sustainability", or the like. And a couple iterations of promoting the "innovators" over the maintainers will rapidly lead to atrophy of core capabilities. Zika or H1N1 represent less than 2% of the total work burden of the CDC, most of being agile is about maintaining capabilities when they are never used. And that is boring and at least currently not great for career advancement.

I wonder how the Defense Department keeps people motivated whose job is to make sure that weapons work over decades of peace, and people and procedures stay trained and ready. It has been widely reported how the CDC morphed in to a social change agency, with tiny fractions of its budget devoted to actual "disease control." The incentives are clear. 

At the Fed too, I sense that just handling money, inflation and sleep-inducing bank regulations isn't enough.  The new generation wants to save the world. 

On the initial speculation that started the whole business, that remote work is bad, a fresh insight: 

Remote work, in my best guess, would likely be a boon for the long-term flexibility of the CDC. Getting folks out of Atlanta and DC, having more capability for folks to work from the breadth of the country, and potentially even letting late career clinical folks have more access to the institution without having to disrupt their lives with a cross-country move are all to the good.

...until a bunch of people get fired, the CDC is unlikely to effectively change. On my more pessimistic days, I figure the real solution would involve burning the place to the ground.

In response to later comments, and interesting to the overall theme of politicization of regulatory agencies, 

..every white house dating back to GHWB has promptly incinerated the structures that their predecessors had developed to manage these threats. Bush II eliminated the Biodefense Czar, Obama closed up Bush's org chart, and then Trump folded Obama's structure into the NSC. None of these had any significant critics at the other end of Pennsylvania Ave demanding them, rather each of them saw the other side's politics as emphasizing the wrong things.

...The CDC basically screwed up early Covid testing six ways to Sunday. They contiminated the test. Their own validation efforts showed something like a 33% failure rate and they let the tests go AND did not warn recipients. Failures to follow protocol, document results, and even basic lab hygiene were not followed (and I would note that CAP would not tolerate half of this in clinical lab). And yet none of the principles were fired. ...

...mostly what I have seen is the civil servants pushing all the blame onto Trump and his voters for being "anti-science". I see continued inflammatory behaviors that I fear are starting to show up in overall reduced vaccination rates. And certainly a lot of the equity verbiage I see coming out suggests a quick reversion to the political positioning that best aids one's career.